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More order with less law: On contract enforcement, trust, and crowding¤
Abstract
Most contracts, whether between voters and politicians or between house owners and contractors, are
incomplete. “More law,” it typically is assumed, increases the likelihood of contract performance by
increasing the probability of enforcement and/or the cost of breach. This paper studies a contractual
relationship where the first mover has to decide whether she wants to enter a contract without knowing
whether the second mover will perform. We analyze how contract enforceability a¤ects individual
performance for exogenous preferences. Then we apply a dynamic model of preference adaptation
and find that economic incentives have a non—monotonic impact on behavior. Individuals perform
a contract when enforcement is strong or weak but not with medium enforcement probabilities:
Trustworthiness is “crowded in” with weak and “crowded out” with medium enforcement. In a
laboratory experiment we test our model’s implications and find support for the crowding prediction.
Our finding is in line with the recent work on the role of contract enforcement and trust in formerly
Communist countries.
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1 Introduction
Trust can increase e¢ciency in the economic and the political spheres. Recent studies using
aggregate data have suggested the existence of an e¢ciency—enhancing feature of trust for
countries and organizations.1 This paper attempts at providing a microfoundation for some
of these findings. It investigates whether trustworthiness can have an economic payo¤ at the
individual level. Important domains for trust and trustworthiness include the relationship
between representatives and their constituents, such as between politicians and voters, man-
agers and shareholders or attorneys and clients. In all these situations, principals have to
decide whether they want to enter a contract with an agent, knowing that the contract will
be incomplete. O¤ering a contract, thus, is a matter of trust, and performing it, a matter of
trustworthiness.
The problem of trust is more pronounced in large, anonymous societies than in small
groups where participants frequently interact. In the latter case, reputation matters and folk
theorem—like arguments can sustain cooperation even in the absence of genuine trustworthi-
ness. In the former case, similar arguments tend to fail, creating the need for institutions,
such as the law, to facilitate e¢cient outcomes.2 The law, however, may a¤ect behavior not
only by creating incentives but also by influencing preferences. Rational choice theory has
focused on the first aspect. In this paper, we propose a model integrating both e¤ects. We
analyze how the enforceability of a contract a¤ects individual performance in the short run
1 See, for example, Putnam (1993), Fukuyama (1995), La Porta et al. (1997) and Knack and Keefer (1997).
2 See, for example, Milgrom, North, and Weingast (1990) and Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast (1994). For
a proof of the folk theorem in the prisoner’s dilemma with large groups and anonymous interaction, see
Ellison (1994). The behavioral relevance of repetition and anonymity have been studied in many laboratory
experiments, see, for example, Andreoni (1988) and Bohnet and Frey (1999). For a survey, see Ostrom (1998)
who also discusses how experimental results relate to political science.
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with given preferences and in the long run when preferences adapt to the new environment.
Our analysis builds on an evolutionary approach.3 We present analytical results and test
their implications in a laboratory experiment.
A contractual relationship is represented by a game in which the first mover has to
decide whether she wants to enter a contract without knowing whether the second mover
will perform. If the second mover breaches, a chance move decides whether he is held liable
for the cost of breach. Standard economic analysis of law predicts that the higher the
expected cost of breach is, the more likely second movers are to perform. We show that,
when preferences are subject to change, this need not be the case. More specifically, we
find that the probability with which a contract is enforced has a non—monotonic impact on
behavior: Second movers’ performance rates are not only high when the expected cost of
breach is su¢ciently large but also when it is su¢ciently small.
We focus on preferences for contract performance and assume that individuals may ex-
perience psychological costs when breaching a contract. Such trustworthy individuals are
said to have a preference for honesty.4 Based on the idea that a specific preference is more
likely to be maintained and to flourish if it proves to be economically successful, we study a
dynamic process in which preferences can change over time. Legal rules can “crowd in” as
well as “crowd out” preferences. We find that intermediate levels of contract enforcement
lead to crowding out while low levels induce crowding in. The intuition for this is rather
3 See, for example, Becker (1976), Axelrod (1984), Boyd and Richerson (1985), Bendor and Swistak (1997),
Bowles 1998, or Güth and Kliemt (1999).
4 We purposely remain vague here because neither does our model depend on the specifics of the psycho-
logical costs incurred nor does our experiment test for di¤erent kinds of such costs. Our results are compatible
with intrinsic motivation (see, for example, Frey 1997), inequality aversion (see, for example, Fehr and Schmidt
1999 or Bolton and Ockenfels 1999), reciprocity (see, for example, Rabin 1993) and psychological contracts
(see, for example, Harrison and Robinson 1997 or Rousseau 1995).
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straightforward. Suppose you are a first mover who has to decide whether to enter a contract.
If you know that the legal system is ine¢cient, i.e., that contracts are rarely enforced, you
will be extremely cautious. Clearly, you would like to enter if you knew your partner was
trustworthy. If you received a signal about your partner’s trustworthiness, you would only
enter if the signal was “su¢ciently good.” This caution protects you from being exploited
too often as well as making trustworthy second movers more successful than others, because
on average, they will get more contracts than others. Hence, honesty will be crowded in.
Contractual relationships with weak enforcement are typical for many organizational
settings. Some firms purposely create a low enforcement environment where interactions are
not guided by the expected cost of breach but by intrinsic motivation. At the same time, these
firms heavily invest in screening of potential future employees, stressing that character is more
important than the possession of specific skills.5 Similarly, most micro-finance institutions
(e.g. Grameen Bank or Accion) lending money to poor clients without physical collateral,
focus on “character-based lending”. In the absence of external enforcement mechanisms, the
intrinsic trustworthiness of their clients is one of the key variables making a contract between
borrowers and lenders possible (Murdoch 1999).
The same pattern applies to many other domains: The more leeway agents have - whether
these are employees, borrowers, legislators, judges or executives - the more careful principals
are when deciding whom to o¤er a contract. That the leeway for politicians can be consid-
erable becomes clear in Rose-Ackerman’s (1999) analysis of corruption. She points out that
(not even) in the United States the law is strict enough to deter elected o¢cials from being
5 See for a summary of such high-commitment human resource management practices, Baron and Kreps
(1999).
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corrupt. “The criminal penalties are ‘not more than three times the monetary equivalent of
the thing in value (i.e. the bribe) or imprisonment for not more than fifteen years, or both’
(18 USC § 201 (a)). This is appropriate for o¢cials who receive bribes except that multi-
plying by three may be a poor measure of the risk of detection and punishment. The actual
probability of catch is likely to be well below one-third.” (p. 55) Whether this probability is
low in enough to induce crowding-in is an empirical question. If the probability of contract
enforcement is higher but not high enough to deter all second movers from breaching, we
expect crowding-out.
With such medium enforcement, the expected payo¤ of entering is higher than the payo¤
of abstaining even if you know that the contract will be breached. Accordingly, you will enter
regardless of your beliefs about your partner’s trustworthiness. This unconditional trust
makes expected monetary payo¤—maximizing second movers more successful than honest
types who forsake profitable opportunities to breach. Therefore, honesty will be crowded
out causing the aforesaid non—monotonicity: With high levels of contract enforceability, all
second movers perform because they are deterred regardless of their preferences, and all
first movers enter the contract; preferences are irrelevant and outcomes are e¢cient. With
intermediate levels, honesty is crowded out; more second movers breach and resources are
wasted in trials. With low levels, trustworthiness is crowded in; more second movers perform
even though they would have an incentive to breach without a preference for honesty and
e¢ciency increases.
Contract enforcement probabilities which are too small to deter breach may be due to a
badly functioning legal system with weak state protection, corrupt governments and judicia-
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ries, or high enforcement costs. So far, it has mainly been discussed how informal institutions,
such as social norms, may substitute for an ine¤ective legal system, and whether shame and
ostracism can replace imprisonment and fines.6 Our model focuses on formal law and intrin-
sic dispositions and shows how the e¤ectiveness of the two motivational factors depends on
each other. By providing a specific legal enforcement regime, the state a¤ects the degree of
trust and trustworthiness in a society. Including formal institutions into the analysis of trust
and trustworthiness addresses an aspect so far little touched in the current debate on trust
and social capital.7 Our findings may help understand two tendencies currently observed in
many countries of the former Soviet bloc: On the one hand, there is a demand for “more law”
in order to enforce contracts and to secure property rights. As the state is unable to provide
levels of enforcement high enough to deter breach, the demand for protection is satisfied pri-
vately. This is one of the explanations for the rise of the Mafia in Sicily (Gambetta 1993) and
may also account for its thriving in Russia (Varese 1994). On the other hand, a reemergence
of the demand for and supply of trust—based relationships can be observed in the very same
countries. In his chapter on “Economics of ethnic capital formation and conflict,” Wintrobe
(1995: 46-47) writes: “The absence of enforceability generates a demand for trust. The costs
of trust formation are lower, when the two parties share common traits, such as a common
language, ethnicity, and so on.” While his analysis is di¤erent from ours, his conclusions
6 Social norms have been shown to confine minor crimes such as trespassing (Ellickson 1991) or the overuse
of common pool resources (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994). For the legal debate about “alternative
sanctions” see Kahan (1996) and for a general discussion of how social norms and the law interact Sunstein
(1996) and Cooter (1998).
7 See Tarrow (1996: 395) who asks: “Can we be satisfied interpreting civic capacity as a home—grown
product in which the state has played no role?” Schneider et al. (1997) are among the few who discuss the
influence of institutions, namely of the extent parents can choose a public school, on social capital. Those
interested in the influence of institutions mainly focus on the relationship between institutions and trust rather
than between institutions and trustworthiness (see, e.g., Brehm and Rahn 1997, Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997
and Norris 1999).
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are similar: More order can be achieved by relying on trust—based relationships where the
parties are able to predict each other’s likelihood of cooperation.
Our analysis provides a possible rationale for the coexistence of these two tendencies.
People cannot help asking for “more law” if trustworthiness has been crowded out. On the
other hand, if it has been crowded in, people can rely on trust—based interactions. Simis
(1982) and Varese (1994) suggest that the former Soviet system was characterized by cor-
ruption rather than organized crime a¤ecting only specific sections of the population, namely
the “nomenclatura.” It is these groups who in the absence of a credible state are unable to
engage in trust—based interactions and thus, demand private protection. On the other hand,
for ordinary people, trust was and still is the basis of their contractual relationships (Win-
trobe 1995). Overall, our model predicts a pattern also described by a Latin American quip:
“A los amigos todo, a los enimigos nada, al extrano la ley.” (For friends everything, for
enemies nothing, for the stranger the law.)8
The model’s empirical validity is tested in the laboratory where we implement the theoret-
ical setup as closely as possible. The experimental results support the crowding predictions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we first study how agents
behave with fixed preferences, then analyze the crowding dynamics and discuss the model’s
main implications. Section 3 presents the design and the experimental results. Section 4
concludes.
8 We found this proverb in Rose-Ackerman (1999, p.97).
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2 Theory
2.1 The contract game
We model a situation in which two players have the opportunity to produce a joint surplus.
There is, however, an asymmetry between the players. Player 1 has to enter the contract
without knowing whether player 2 will perform. Therefore, player 1’s decision whether to
enter the contract is a matter of trust.9
We denote her trusting move with T and her non—trusting move with T . In the case
where she trusts, player 2 can perform (move P ) or breach (P ). The game ends if either
player 1 does not enter, which yields zero—payo¤s for both parties, or if player 1’s trust is
rewarded by player 2’s cooperation. This yields payo¤s of 1 for both players.10 In case of
breach, we assume that there is a final chance move capturing a litigation process. With
probability p player 2 will be held liable (move L). The surplus is divided as in the case of
performance but player 2 has to bear the costs of the trial c > 0, i.e. we assume that perfect
expectation damages place the trusting party in the position it would have been in if the
other party had performed and that all legal fees are paid by the losing party.11 Thus, the
payo¤s are 1 for player 1 and 1¡ c for player 2. If player 2 is not held liable (L) he profits
from breach and receives a payo¤ of 1+b (with b > 0) while player 1 su¤ers a loss. Her payo¤
is ¡a with a ¸ c as she bears the legal cost and is not compensated for any investments she
made by entering the contract.
9 For related games on trust, see Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), Burnham, McCabe and Smith
(1999), Gueth and Kliemt (1999), or Van Huyck, Battalio, and Walters (1995).
10 This specification of the payo¤s is a simple normalization without loss of generality.
11 This corresponds to the English legal cost allocation rule.
7
Figure 1: The contract game with monetary payo¤s.
Breach is never e¢cient. The benefits from breach are not large enough to compensate
the first mover, i.e., b < 1 + a. Figure 1 shows this game in its extensive form.
We assume that all payo¤s are monetary. However, in order to solve the game we need
utilities associated with the various outcomes. To map outcomes into (cardinal) utilities
we assume that there are two possible preferences a player can have, i.e., players can be of
two di¤erent types. One type (M) is only interested in (expected) monetary payo¤s. This
means that for this type the monetary payo¤s in Figure 1 represent utilities. The second
type (H) is assumed to have a preference for honesty. In particular, we assume that this type
su¤ers from psychological costs when breaching a contract. These costs are assumed to be
su¢ciently high such that a player of type H would never betray regardless of the monetary
gain b.12
12 This assumption simplifies the analysis without altering its results. All results would still hold if we
allowed for a larger set of preferences incorporating di¤erent levels of psychological costs. Notice that in the
case of a continuous type space–possibly ranging from infinite (psychological) costs to infinite gains–all that
8
Having introduced the set of possible preferences {M,H} we can transform the ‘money
game’ of Figure 1 into a standard game where the payo¤s are von Neumann—Morgenstern
utilities. This is done by replacing the payo¤ of player 2 after path TPL by 1+ b¡ ! where
! = 0 for type M and ! > b for type H.
Assuming that player 1 recognizes which type player 2 is, we have, for each possible match
of players, a well—specified standard game.13 We solve this game by backward induction.14
Obviously, player 2 will breach if his expected payo¤ from breach exceeds 1, i.e. if
p(1¡ c) + (1¡ p)(1 + b¡ !) > 1. (1)
As assumed, for type H this is never fulfilled. A player 2 with a preference for honesty will
always choose P . For type M, we can insert ! = 0 into inequality 1 and rewrite it as
p <
b
b+ c
. (2)
Next, we can focus on the decision of player 1. If she is confronted with an H—type she will
surely trust. The same is true if she is confronted with an M—type and p > bb+c holds. But
if she is confronted with an M—type and (2) is fulfilled she will enter only if her expected
payo¤ from entering exceeds her outside—option payo¤, i.e., if p¡ a(1¡ p) > 0. This can be
rearranged as
p >
a
1 + a
. (3)
matters is whether the costs are larger or smaller than the monetary gain b.
13 If player 2 is of type M the game is identical to the one of Figure 1. If player 2 is of type H the payo¤
after path TPL is 1 + b¡ ± < 1 + b.
14 Admittedly, the assumption of perfect type recognition is strong. However, the results of our analysis
hold as long as players receive su¢ciently informative signals about their opponents’ types. This is also
discussed in section 2.3 and illustrated in Appendix B. The main e¤ect of assuming perfect signals is that
it simplifies notation and analysis significantly. Recent experimental evidence supports the notion that type
recognition is possible after pre—play communication in a prisoners’ dilemma game (see Orbell and Dawes
1991, or Frank, Gilovich, and Regan 1993). Kikuchi, Watanabe and Yamagishi (1995) found that trustworthy
types were better in predicting others’ types than non-trustworthy types. More generally, see Frank (1988).
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From this follows
Proposition 1 The (unique) subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) is
(T,P ) if player 2 is of type H or if player 2 is of type M and p > bb+c [High p];
(T,P ) if player 2 is of type M and a1+a < p <
b
b+c [Medium p];
(T ,P ) if player 2 is of type M and p < min
n
a
1+a ,
b
b+c
o
[Low p].
In what follows we shall assume that ac < b. Otherwise (T, P ) would never be an SPE
and the crowding analysis would be less rich and less interesting. Imposing this requirement
means, informally speaking, that the loss player 1 incurs after having been betrayed and not
compensated must be relatively small in comparison to the profit of player 2 and the legal
costs.
2.2 Crowding
The previous subsection showed how individuals with given preferences behave under di¤er-
ent legal regimes. We now allow for preferences to adapt to the contractual situation and
study the implications of “preference crowding” for our model. Economically successful pref-
erences are crowded in, unsuccessful preferences are crowded out. Formally, this means that
the share of types with a certain preference grows faster than another share, if and only if
the average material earnings of the former exceed the average earnings of the latter. In the
context of our model and in the absence of a fully fledged theory of preference formation, this
assumption seems natural. Contracts are closed to secure material benefits and the outcomes
of our contract game are exclusively characterized by di¤erent resource allocations.15
15 For earlier studies analyzing endogenous preferences in a similar framework, see, for example, Bester and
Güth (1998), Huck and Oechssler (1999), To (1999), and especially Güth and Kliemt (1999) who also deal with
the issue of trust. Pioneering studies suggesting that endogenous preferences may result from payo¤—driven
(evolutionary) dynamics are Becker (1976) and Hirshleifer (1977). However, we do not wish to generalize too
much here as di¤erent mechanisms may apply if one deals with attitudes towards drugs, religion or other
domains in which outcomes are less tangible. For a survey of alternative approaches, see Bowles (1998).
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The assumption that successful “traits” spread is often associated with models of genetic
evolution, although it can be justified di¤erently.16 One justification is o¤ered in Appendix
A which briefly illustrates a stochastic model of individual preference adaptation.17 In our
model, this implies the following: If honesty leads to forsaking profitable opportunities such
that a typical H—type earns less than a typicalM—type, honesty will be crowded out. On the
other hand, honesty will be crowded in if individuals are in an environment favoring honesty
such that, on average, H—types earn more than M—types.
In order to calculate how successful the two di¤erent types (of preferences) are, we assume
that individuals are randomly matched to play the contract game, and that there are enough
individuals such that the law of large numbers can be applied. This allows us to take expected
values as a measure of success.
Proposition 1 shows that what happens when two players interact depends on the value
of p, the probability that the contract is enforced. As indicated in the proposition we can
distinguish three regimes. For each regime we can now study how preferences are crowded
in and out.
High p (p > bb+c)
In this case, all individuals, regardless of type and matching, will play the SPE (T, P ).
This means that individuals of both types receive the same expected monetary payo¤. Thus,
there will not be any crowding and regardless of the numbers of H— and M—types, the large
16 See Börgers and Sarin (1997) and Schlag (1998) for two such justifications.
17 The probabilities with which preferences are adapted are assumed to depend on two factors, economic
success and conformity. The more an individual’s environment favors a certain preference and the more
common a certain preference is, the more likely it is that an individual will develop the same preference.
(Note, however, that adaptation is not deliberate. People cannot consciously decide about their preferences.
For a di¤erent approach, see Cooter 1998.) We show that this process behaves, under certain additional
regularity assumptions, like a growth—monotonic (evolutionary) process.
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enforcement probability ensures performance.
Medium p ( a1+a < p <
b
b+c)
With medium p, behavior in a match depends on the type of player 2. If player 2 is
of type H, the SPE is (T,P ). If he is of type M , the SPE is (T,P ). Since M maximizes
expected monetary payo¤s while H does not, it follows that average earnings of M—types
exceed average earnings of H—types. In the role of player 2, M—types earn on average
p(1¡ c) + (1¡ p)(1 + b), which is strictly greater than 1, the payo¤ of an H—type in the role
of player 2. When in the role of player 1, M—types and H—types do equally well on average,
since the expected payo¤ of a player 1 is independent of her own type. Thus, with medium
p, M—types always earn more than H—types (regardless of the current number of them).
Accordingly, honest preferences will be crowded out. This implies, asymptotically for the
long run, that H—types will completely vanish and that all individuals will play equilibrium
(T,P ).
Low p (p < a1+a)
We proceed as in the above case, but now take into account that (T ,P ) is the SPE if
player 2 is of type M and that (T, P ) is the SPE if player 2 is of type H. In this case,
the earnings of H—types exceed the earnings of M—types. When in the role of player 2, the
former always receive 1, the latter always 0. When in the role of player 1, the average payo¤s
of the two types are again identical. They do not depend on their own type. Thus, with low
p, preferences for honesty are crowded in and, in the long run, type M will vanish such that
all individuals will play the trust—rewarding equilibrium (T, P ).
We summarize our results in
Proposition 2 In the case where
12
a
1+a < p <
b
b+c M H
M 1 + b¡ a+ p(1¡ b+ a¡ c) 2 + b¡ p(b+ c)
H 1¡ a+ p(1 + a) 2
Table 1: The evolutionary game with medium p.
p < a1+a M H
M 0 1
H 1 2
Table 2: The evolutionary game with low p.
p > bb+c there is no crowding; in the long run both types may be present in the society
and all individuals play (T,P );
a
1+a < p <
b
b+c trustworthiness is crowded out; in the long run only type M will be present
in the society and all individuals play (T, P );
p < a1+a trustworthiness is crowded in; in the long run only type H will be present in the
society and all individuals play (T,P ).
The long—run stable states can also be derived by analyzing evolutionary games in which
the two types compete. For p > bb+c this game is trivial as both types behave identically and
receive identical payo¤s. For the other cases the two matrix games in Tables 1 and 2 emerge.
(Note that the payo¤s are based on the assumption that both types are equally likely to
become player 1 or 2.)
As p < bb+c , it is easy to see that the game has a unique evolutionarily stable strategy
(see Maynard Smith 1982). There is a unique equilibrium (M,M) and the equilibrium
strict. Hence, the unique evolutionarily stable strategy is M . This mirrors the second result
of Proposition 2: In the long run only M—types survive.
An even simpler matrix emerges in case of p < a1+a . Clearly, the unique equilibrium of
this game is (H,H) and as the equilibrium is strict, the unique evolutionarily stable strategy
is H. This mirrors the third result of Proposition 2.
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2.3 Discussion
There are two main implications of Proposition 2. The most fundamental one is that it
is impossible to predict behavior in a group of agents playing the contract game without
knowing their history. Individuals’ preferences are subject to change, and outcomes in one
round a¤ect the distribution of types in the next. And, since individuals’ preferences depend
on past regimes, so do their actions. The longer a group of agents has played in a low—
probability environment, the more individuals with a preference for honesty are present and
the less breach is observed. Vice- versa for a medium—p environment. Also it may be possible
that groups have experienced regime changes in the past in which case one does not only
need to know how long the group has been playing under the current regime, but also how
long under the preceding one. The total crowding history matters.
The second significant implication of the proposition is that the probability of contract
enforcement exerts a non—monotonic e¤ect on behavior. Such a non—monotonicity would not
occur in standard models with fixed preferences.18 The worst legal regime is not one where
contracts cannot be enforced but one with an intermediate level of contract enforceability.
With an intermediate p there is no need for first movers to care about with whom they
interact, since entering the contract is better than staying with the outside option, even if
the contract is breached. This lack of caution makes those who are dishonest economically
successful. Accordingly, the share of dishonest types will grow. This is the situation which
gave the present study its title: There are two alternatives–“more order with more law” or
18 The first authors highlighting the possibility of such non—monotonicities are, to the best of our knowledge,
Akerlof and Dickens (1982). They study a model with cognitive dissonance which may induce players to re—
evaluate outcomes.
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“more order with less law”.
With less law, first movers have to be extremely cautious. They have to think about
their partners’ trustworthiness which makes honesty a successful preference. In our model,
first movers receive a perfect signal about their opponents’ type and their decision rule is
simple: “Only enter a contract if your opponent is trustworthy.” With a stochastic signal
the rule would be very similar: “Only enter if the signal is good enough.” This illustrates
how our results would extend to the more general case of imperfect but informative signals.
With perfect signals, M—types in the role of player 2 are never o¤ered contracts when p is
low while H —types always get contracts. With imperfect signals, some M—types would get
contracts while some H—types would not (namely whenever the signal is wrong). However,
if the signal is su¢ciently informative H—types will get more contracts than M—types which
is required for crowding in. Appendix B elaborates on the case of imperfect signals further.
Comparing the two alternative policies for replacing a medium probability regime (“more
or less law”), two di¤erences can be observed. The first one is due to the dynamic nature
of our analysis. With “more law”, more order is instantaneously achieved since performance
becomes rational for everybody and so does entering. This is di¤erent in the case of “less
law” because after the change of the regime the crowding process needs some time. Though
our experimental results below indicate that adjustments can be pretty fast in small groups,
the behavior does not change instantaneously. This is an argument in favor of the standard
law—and—order approach. However, “less law” is less costly. In our model, we disregard
all fixed costs of legal contract enforcement and also variable costs being a function of p.
Increasing p costs resources. Decreasing p saves resources.
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Here we do not wish to make any judgement about what is the better policy. Instead we
test our model’s empirical validity in the laboratory.
3 Experiment
3.1 Design
The experimental design tries to implement our model as closely as possible. Subjects partic-
ipated in a 2—person contract game and were randomly matched. Six sessions with altogether
154 subjects were conducted and the game was repeated several times. Focussing on crowding
in (“more order with less law”), subjects in all sessions were confronted with a low contract
enforcement probability during the last rounds. In order to create di¤erent histories, the
legal regime in the first few rounds was varied. If behavior was driven by incentives only,
behavior should be independent of the history created in earlier rounds and should only
depend on the current legal regime. If preferences adapt to the legal regime, on the other
hand, the history of earlier rounds should also a¤ect the likelihood of performance in later
rounds.
Experimental subjects were confronted with identical payo¤ tables and the payo¤s were
• 50 cents for each player whenever the first mover chose T ;
• 150 cents for each player in case of TP ;
• 150 cents for the first and 120 cents for the second mover in case of TPL;
• 20 cents for the first and 250 cents for the second mover in case of TPL.
Thus, the normalized payo¤ variables were a = .3, b = 1, and c = .3. The probabilities
16
were .1, .5, and .9.19
Subjects received payments for each round. Instructions (see Appendix C) were neutrally
framed. After each round, aggregate information on outcomes was provided, i.e. first and
second movers knew how many contracts were o¤ered and performed in the previous round.
Providing information on the distribution of types only serves as a conservative test of our
model, as individuals’ types could not perfectly be detected. As the crowding model assumes
random matching, we implemented a stranger treatment in five sessions and used a fixed—pair
matching in one control session. Table 3 presents an overview of all sessions.
The experiments were conducted at two di¤erent universities (labelled B and H).20
Participation was voluntary; interested students could sign up for an experimental session
and were paid a show—up fee of $5. The experiments took approximately 45 minutes. Average
earnings were approximately $15.
Subjects were identified by code numbers only and anonymity was fully preserved. After
having signed a consent form, participants were randomly assigned to the roles of first and
second mover and given a written instruction and an envelope containing a code number
sheet and nine decision sheets, all marked with the subject’s code number. Instructions were
repeated orally, allowing subjects to ask questions and to control that everybody faced the
same decision task. In all but session 4, they were truthfully assured that they would be
randomly matched with a di¤erent person after each round. They were told that nine rounds
would be played and that they would publicly be informed on the aggregate outcome after
19 Subjects carried out the chance moves themselves. After each round a randomly chosen participant
picked a card from a pile of red and black cards.
20 This labelling follows the APSR guide lines for double—blind reviewing.
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Session Matching Prob. 1—3 Prob. 4—9 # subjects Univ.
1 (RLLB) Random Low (p = .1) Low (p = .1) 20 B
2 (RMLB) Random Medium (p = .5) Low (p = .1) 28 B
3 (RHLB) Random High (p = .9) Low (p = .1) 28 B
4 (FMLB) Fixed Medium (p = .5) Low (p = .1) 16 B
5 (RLLH) Random Low (p = .1) Low (p = .1) 34 H
6 (RMLH) Random Medium (p = .5) Low (p = .1) 28 H
Table 3: Experimental sessions.
each round. Individual results were private information. Subjects could not anticipate the
regime change in round 4.21 However, when they were informed about the new conditions,
they were also told that they would play under the new regime for the remaining six rounds.
3.2 Results
Our theory predicts history—dependent behavior. The longer individuals are confronted with
a low—p environment, the more trustworthiness should be crowded in, and the higher perfor-
mance rates should be. High enforcement probabilities are expected to be crowding—neutral,
while trustworthiness should be crowded out with medium probabilities.22
Appendix D presents the results for all sessions in all rounds. First, we briefly examine
session 4 with fixed pairs. This is a simple control session as the requirements for crowding
are not fulfilled. There is no random matching and therefore no interaction on the group
level. Instead, subjects play a finitely repeated game. Experiments on other games with
cooperative gains (e.g., repeated public goods games or gift exchange games) reveal that
with this kind of matching, cooperation rates are typically higher than standard theory
expects. Furthermore, cooperation rates seem to be relatively stable over time, but break
21 The instructions neither told them that the environment would remain constant nor that it would change.
22 However, these predictions cannot be viewed as deterministic since the law of large numbers does not
apply in the lab (see also Appendix A).
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down towards the end of the game when the “shadow of the future” loses its power and
reputation no longer plays a role. This strong drop in the last rounds has been called an
“end game e¤ect” (Selten and Stoecker 1983).23 If the contract game is comparable to
these games, we should observe a similar pattern. Inspection of Appendix D confirms this
expectation: We find that in the fixed—pairs session cooperation drops from 100% to 0% in
the last round.
In contrast, our crowding theory predicts increasing cooperation over time and rules out
an end—game e¤ect. After all, it predicts that trustworthy second movers perform because
they receive less utility from breaching than from performing, even though breaching leads
to a higher monetary payo¤. Table 4 shows aggregate data for rounds 4 to 9 in all random—
matching sessions. It suggests that there is a trend towards more cooperation which does
not break down. On the contrary, the performance rate (the number of contracts performed
divided by the number of contracts o¤ered) reaches its maximum in the last round which is
in line with the crowding prediction. We summarize by
Result 1 In the low—probability environment with random matching, performance rates
increase over time and there is no end—game e¤ect.
Our model assumes that it is most e¢cient if all second movers perform. We expect
high e¢ciency rates instantaneously when enforcement is strong, and only slow increases in
e¢ciency rates over time with low enforcement probabilities. Figure 2 presents the e¢ciency
rates (the number of contracts performed divided by the number of all possible contracts),
the percentage of performed contracts, for the sessions with random matching. In the short
23 For additional evidence, see Andreoni (1988) and Croson (1996) who di¤erentiate between cooperation
based on reputation and reciprocity.
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Aggregate Round
Data 4 5 6 7 8 9
No Trust (T ) 40 38 29 34 27 35
Trust & Breach (T,P ) 17 12 16 11 14 8
Trust & Perf. (T,P ) 12 19 24 24 28 26
Performance Rate .41 .61 .63 .69 .67 .77
Table 4: Aggregate random—matching data for rounds 4 to 9
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Figure 2: E¢ciency rates over time (Berkeley only).
run, high enforcement probabilities lead to the most e¢cient outcomes. In the medium
term, when the crowding dynamics start to become relevant, the low—p environment is most
e¢cient. The longer subjects have been confronted with a low—p environment, the less the
di¤erential e¤ects of their respective crowding histories apply.
Result 2 In the short run, e¢ciency rates are highest when enforcement is strong; in the
medium term, they are highest in the low—probability environment; in the long run,
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the di¤erential e¤ects of enforcement and crowding tend to vanish.
In order to analyze the data more thoroughly, we next estimate binary choice models for
first movers’ propensity to enter and second movers’ propensity to perform, and control for
the relevance of crowding compared to economic incentives and for university fixed e¤ects.
In order to measure crowding let
"tj =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1 if p is small in group j in round t
0 if p is high in group j in round t
¡1 if p is medium in group j in round t
and let
CROWDtj =
t¡1X
h=1
"hj .
The variable "tj indicates whether our theory predicts crowding in (+1), crowding out (¡1),
or no crowding (0) and the variable CROWDtj summarizes the “crowding history” of group
j up to round t. If the theory is relevant we would expect that CROWDtj helps explain the
propensity of second movers to perform.24
Besides CROWD we also include the following variables as covariates:
• PERFORM t¡1j –the performance rate in group j in round t ¡ 1 , measured as the
number of contracts performed divided by the number of contracts o¤ered;
• ENTERt¡1j –the rate of entering in group j in round t¡ 1, measured as the number
of contracts entered divided by the number of first movers in group j;
24 One could argue that this definition is somewhat arbitrary and we agree. By no means, do we claim
that CROWD captures the “true story”, and certainly we do not claim that crowding is linear. Probably it
is not. However, we think that this a “Bayesian approach”. In the absence of any specification which is a
priori more natural than another, the above definition is the most simple one and can be justified by taking
expected values over equally probable alternatives. Furthermore, if we find a significant e¤ect of CROWD in
its current form, any “optimal” definition would increase its significance.
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• INCENT tj–a dummy variable indicating whether the first mover has an incentive to
enter the contract if only monetary payo¤s play a role, i.e. INCENT tj = 1 if p is
medium or high and INCENT tj = 0 otherwise.
• INCPERF tj–a dummy variable indicating whether the second mover has an incentive
to perform the contract if only monetary payo¤s play a role, i.e. INCPERF tj = 1 if p
is high and INCPERF tj = 0 otherwise.
• UNIVj–a dummy variable indicating the university group j belonged to; UNIVj = 1
for H and UNIVj = 0 for B.
Furthermore, we also run (logistic) regressions including subject dummies Sji.25
The estimated model without subject dummies is
ln
qtrji
1¡ qtrji
= #+ $0CROWD
t
j
+$1PERFORM
t¡1
j + $2ENTER
t¡1
j
+$3INCENT
t
j + $4INCPERF
t
j
+$5UNIVj + %ji
with qtrji indicating either first mover i’s propensity to enter or second mover i’s to perform.
Table 5 presents the results for first movers’ decisions, Table 6 for second movers’ decisions.
All sessions with random matching are included.
We find that first movers’ behavior is mainly driven by the economic incentives they face
and by the performance rate of the last round. In the estimation without subject dummies
25 We use nested e¤ect coding (see Königstein 1998) as the subject dummies are nested in the university
dummy.
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First movers
without subject dummies with subject dummies
Coe¤. Sign. R Coe¤. Sign. R
CROWDtj .048 .175 .000 ¡.103 .189 .000
PERFORM t¡1j 2.062 .000 .160 5.441 .000 .218
ENTERt¡1j .530 .247 .000 ¡.263 .729 .000
INCENT tj 2.553 .000 .173 7.955 .000 .185
INCPERF tj 4.649 .684 .000 5.914 .856 .000
UNIVj ¡.518 .015 ¡.072 ¡1.838 .724 .000
Const. ¡1.296 .000 ¡1.999 .514
Table 5: Logistic regression for first movers’ propensity to enter (552 observations). R is the
partial contribution measuring the relative importance of each variable.
Second movers
without subject dummies with subject dummies
Coe¤. Sign. R Coe¤. Sign. R
CROWDtj .125 .030 .077 .792 .000 .183
PERFORM t¡1j 1.493 .034 .080 ¡.959 .566 .000
ENTERt¡1j ¡.864 .223 .000 ¡1.731 .319 .000
INCENT tj ¡.177 .743 .000 ¡1.454 .303 .000
INCPERF tj 2.057 .006 .115 15.225 .708 .000
UNIVj .594 .034 .077 2.588 .915 .000
Const. ¡.505 .365 ¡.484 .972
Table 6: Logistic regression for second movers’ propensity to perform (312 observations). R
is the partial contribution measuring the relative importance of each variable.
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we also find a significant e¤ect of the university dummy: on average, H students enter
less often than B students. Since the university dummy loses its significance when subject
dummies are introduced we are confident that the di¤erence between H and B is not due to
some di¤erences in the experimental procedures (of which we were not aware). Rather, the
di¤erence is on the individual level.
The same is true for second movers where we find that H students are more trustworthy
than B students. Again, this e¤ect disappears when we control for di¤erences between
individuals. In the estimation without subject dummies we find three additional variables
which help explain second movers’ decisions: economic incentives (less breaching if breach
is deterred), last round’s performance rate (such that there is some inertia), and finally, the
variable capturing the crowding history of groups (the longer subjects interacted in a low—p
environment, the more likely they are to be trustworthy). The latter variable is the only one
which remains significant when we include subject dummies. We summarize by
Result 3 First movers’ propensity to enter mainly depends on their monetary incentives and
on second movers’ previous performance rate. Second movers’ propensity to perform
mainly depends on their crowding history.
The second part of Result 3 is the key result of this study as it confirms the qualitative
predictions of the crowding theory. It is, however, a result on the aggregate level, and it seems
worthwhile to investigate whether the theory also predicts individual behavior well. The main
prediction of our model on the individual level is that in the low—p environment, subjects
who have breached contracts once are much more likely to switch to honest behavior than
vice—versa. In order to analyze this hypothesis we simply count how many second movers
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Session breach ! perform unpredicted switches behavior fixed N
1 (RLLB) 7 — 3 10
2 (RMLB) 6 1 7 14
3 (RHLB) 9 — 5 14
4 (RLLH) 6 3 8 17
5 (RMLH) 5 — 9 14
Total 33 4 32 69
Table 7: Individual behavior in the low—probability environment.
switch from breaching to performing once p is low. Additionally, we count how many second
movers switch in unpredicted directions and how many never switch once p is low. Table
7 presents the results. The picture is clear: 53.6% of all subjects changed their behavior
in the low—probability environment. And of these, 89.2% switched in the direction which is
predicted. In other words, 33 second movers breached in the early phases of the experiment
and then performed later, even though the money—maximizing strategy would have been to
stick to the old behavior. None of these 33 subjects switched back to breaching. They became
trustworthy, even though they started by breaching. On the other hand, there are only very
few unpredicted switches.26 The null—hypothesis that the switching of behavior is random
can be rejected at a significance level of .01%. Thus, the crowding theory’s predictions are
also confirmed by analyzing individual data.
4 Conclusion
We have studied a model where the (legal) rules of a game do not only have short—run but also
long—run e¤ects on behavior because they a¤ect preferences. In a contractual relationship,
economic incentives have a non—monotonic impact on contract performance. Our theoretical
model complements recent approaches studying how rules and preferences interact (see, for
26 Notice that, as the theory is stochastic, these instances are not entirely unpredicted.
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example, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) as the latter only allow for di¤erences in preferences but
not for preferences to change. Our model suggests that the rules of the game determine
which preferences dominate. More specifically, it predicts that low levels of legal contract
enforcement crowd in trustworthiness. As first movers cannot trust the legal system, they
only enter a contract if they can trust the second movers. They are careful when deciding
whether to enter a contract, thus making trustworthiness a successful trait.
Arguing from a di¤erent perspective, others come to very similar conclusions. Mansbridge
(1999), e.g., discusses various ways of encouraging trustworthiness and trust and concludes:
“When the trustworthiness of a population is too low to sustain a general stance of initial
trust, and when geographic and social mobility make reputational, kin and local sanctions
less viable, the trustworthy members of a given population will benefit from finding ways of
distinguishing themselves and other trustworthy individuals from the untrustworthy (...) the
trustworthy would find it useful to train themselves to recognize subtle signs of trustworthi-
ness in others and also to develop in themselves signs that could not easily be mimicked.” (p.
305). Di¤erences in incentives to learn about others’ dispositions may account for some of
the cross—cultural di¤erences in behavior found in laboratory experiments. Yamagishi, Cook,
and Watanabe (1998), e.g., argue that Japanese are less are less trusting and less trustworthy
than American subjects because contract enforcement mechanisms and assurance structures
are more prevalent in Japan than in the United States.
With high levels of contract enforcement, when contracts are completely specified, in-
terpersonal trust is replaced by institutional trust in the legal system. First movers enter a
contract because second movers are deterred from breaching.
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While previous work on crowding focused on the relevance of preferences when contracts
are complete,27 we show that it is not the complete contract which crowds out trustwor-
thiness but the semi—specified contract. With intermediate levels of contract enforcement,
second movers are not yet deterred from breaching, and for first movers entering is financially
more attractive than the outside option. Interpersonal trust is replaced by institutional trust
in the legal system and genuine trustworthiness is crowded out. Such semi—specified con-
tracts cause a non—monotonicity of behavior: More order can result from less law, yielding
a “motivation—compatible” environment (Bohnet and Frey 1997), as well as from more law
yielding an incentive—compatible environment.
Closely related to this finding are results by Huang and Wu (1994) and Huck (1998).
Using psychological game theory28 and modeling games very similar to ours, Huang and
Wu (1994) show that if players’ payo¤s also depend on beliefs, di¤erent levels of order may
result from the same level of law; i.e., there is a multiplicity of equilibria. Simply speaking,
there is one equilibrium in which everybody believes that the society is well—functioning and
that trust is rewarded, and this becomes self—fulfilling. If everybody believes the opposite
is true, then it also becomes self—fulfilling. A crucial di¤erence between Huang and Wu’s
approach and ours is that preferences (over payo¤s and beliefs) are fixed in their model.
Thus, there are also no obvious dynamics leading from one state to another and there is
no straightforward link between institutional design and behavior. This is di¤erent in Huck
27 See for policy examples, the early research by Titmuss (1970), Frey (1997) for the crowding out of tax
morale, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) for the crowding out of civic duty in a siting context and Gneezy
and Rustichini (1999) in every day life. For experimental evidence, see the extensive survey of studies in
psychology by Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999) as well Falk, Gächter and Kovacs (1999). For the disruption
of “implicit agreements” in the organizational context, see Arrow (1974).
28 See Geneakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1989).
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(1998) who shows in the context of criminal law that if preferences are allowed to change,
socially desirable behavior can be induced with lower levels of (monetary) punishments than
one would conclude assuming fixed preferences.
The implications of our model were tested in an experiment in which we tried to map the
theoretical assumptions into a laboratory environment as precisely as possible. The results
support our qualitative predictions. If there is enough time for the crowding dynamics to
unfold, low enforcement—probability environments can produce outcomes as e¢cient as high
levels of contract enforcement.
To the best of our knowledge, our results provide the first empirical evidence for long—
run e¤ects of legal rules on behavior. While experiments simplify reality, we tried to weaken
the trade—o¤ between external and internal validity as much as we could. Our design of
the contract game is informed by real life institutions and represents a situation where
legal enforcement leads to perfect expectation damages, and transaction costs are allocated
according to the English rule. The “long run” in our experiment is nine rounds (or 45
minutes) which we interpret as a conservative test of crowding. In fact, we were surprised
that the crowding dynamics unfolded as quickly and that our subjects’ inclination to trust
and to be trustworthy changed in such a short time span. Our experimental results, thus,
support the institutionalists’ view that institutional changes a¤ect behavior. However, the
paper tried to show that, by a¤ecting behavior, institutions also a¤ect preferences.
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Appendix
A A stochastic model of individual preference adaptation
Consider a large population of individuals who may be heterogenous with respect to their
preferences. Let - be the finite set of possible preferences and & a typical element of this set.
When individuals interact, their behavior and earnings depend on the exact situation they
face and on the their types. For a given situation (e.g. a game which specifies only monetary
payo¤s) we can denote the monetary payo¤ of individual i as 'i(&i,&¡i) where &¡i denotes
the types of all individuals i is interacting with. (For situations with multiple equilibria,
this implies that there is a ready selection criterion at hand.) Individuals are matched by a
matching scheme S, i.e., S maps the set of individuals itself. The average payo¤ individuals
of a certain type &0 earn depends on &0, S, and the current profile of types, denoted by
the cumulative distribution function F (&). It can be written as ¦(&0, S, F (&)) or as ¦(&0).
For convenience, we restrict ourselves to discrete time, t being the time index. Accordingly,
let f t(&) denote the share of individuals who are of type & at time t. The expression
f t+1(!)¡ft(!)
ft(!) = g(&) reflects the growth rate of type &.
We assume that preference changes occur stochastically and within individuals. Let
q(&0,&00) be the probability that an individual’s preference &0 changes to &00. Obviously,
P
!00 q(&
0,&00) = 1. Furthermore, we assume that these probabilities depend on two factors,
economic success and conformity.29 To capture the role of conformity we assume
29 The role of conformity in shaping cultural evolution has been pointed out by Boyd and Richerson
(1985). For a discussion of this and an alternative modelling approach see Bowles (1999). How conformity
can a¤ect consumption preferences is, for example, illustrated in Urberg (1992) who deals with smoking, or
in Oostveen, Knibbe, and DeVries (1996) who deal with drinking. Experimental evidence in the context of
resource dilemmas can be found, for example, in Smith and Bell (1994). For economic models incorporating
conformity, see Bernheim (1994) or Akerlof (1997).
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Assumption 1 (conformity) Ceteris paribus, q(&0,&00) is proportional to f(&00) .
Assumption 1 implies that q(&0,&00) can be written as f(&00) times some other function
Q(&0,&00). In order to embed the role of economic success we assume the following.
Assumption 2 (economic success) Q(&0,&00) only depends on ¦(&00) and is strictly in-
creasing in it.
This gives rise to a stochastic process where F (&) develops over time. Below we will
show that under certain additional (regularity) assumptions such a process behaves like a
growth—monotonic evolutionary process, i.e., like a process assumed in the main body of
the paper where shares of types grow according to their relative economic success. These
assumptions are
Assumption 3 (regularity) (a) The matching scheme S specifies random matching. (b)
The population is large enough for the law of large numbers to apply.
Theorem 3 Under Assumptions 1 to 3 the dynamic process of individual preference adap-
tation behaves like a growth—monotonic evolutionary process, i.e. g(&0) > g(&00) , ¦(&0) >
¦(&00).
Proof. With Assumptions 1 and 3 we can write
f t+1(&0) =
X
!
f t(&)Q(&,&0)f t(&0).
Therefore,
g(&0) > g(&00),
X
!
f t(&)Q(&,&0) >
X
!
f t(&)Q(&,&00).
Due to Assumption 2 Q(&,&0) > Q(&,&00), ¦(&0) > ¦(&00). Hence, the claim follows.
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The widely used replicator dynamics belong to the class of growth—monotonic evolution-
ary processes and it is easy to see when a process of individual preference adaptation behaves
like the replicator dynamics.
Corollary 4 If q(&0,&00) = ¦(!
00)P
!
f(!)¦(!)
f(&00) the process of individual preference adaptation
behaves like the replicator dynamics.
Proof. Straightforward.
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B A simple case with imperfect signals
Suppose first movers receive, prior to making their decision whether or not to enter the
contract, a signal s 2 R. The signal technology is the following: If player 2’s true type
is H, the signal is 1 + %, with % being normally distributed with mean zero and variance
(2. If player 2’s true type is M , the signal is 0 + %, with % coming from the same normal
distribution.
How will player 1 decide about whether to enter the contract? Nothing changes in case
of p > a1+a : She will always enter. (This follows from the fact that she even enters when she
knows for sure that player 2 is of type M .) In case of p < a1+a player 1 has to update her
beliefs about the type of her partner by using Bayes’ rule. And if and only if the probability
for player 2 being of type is large enough, she will enter. Hence, there will be a critical value
s such that player 1 enters if s ¸ s and stays out otherwise.
Given s and the signal technology one can now compute the probabilities with which the
two di¤erent types are o¤ered contracts. And using these probabilities one can calculate the
expected payo¤s of both types or, in a population model, the average payo¤ of both types.
Obviously, H—types will always get more contracts than M—types. (That signal s exceeds
s is more likely for H—types.) On the other hand, M—types benefit from profitable breach.
Which of these two e¤ects is the stronger one critically depends on how noisy the signal is,
i.e., on the variance (2.
There are two boundary cases: (i) (! 0, the case of a perfect signal, where the first e¤ect
is stronger than the second (and where trustworthiness is crowded in). (ii) ( !1, the case
without a signal where the second e¤ect is stronger (and trustworthiness is crowded out).
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Obviously, one can now find a critical standard deviation, (, inducing identical expected
monetary payo¤s for both types. If the standard deviation is above this level, M—types will
earn more than H—types and the third result of Proposition 2 would be reversed. If the
standard deviation is, however, below this level the original result is resurrected.
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C Sample instructions
for random matching, medium probability, player 1 and the first phase of the experiment
Welcome to this research project!
You are participating in a study in which you have the opportunity to earn cash. The actual
amount of cash you will earn depends on your choices and the choices of other persons. At the end
of the study, the amount of cash earned will be added to your show—up fee and paid to you in cash.
What the study is about:
The study is on how people decide. You are randomly matched with another person present in
this room. You and the other person have to choose between two alternatives. The payo¤ table tells
you how much money you earn depending on what you choose and what the other person chooses.
How the study is conducted:
The study is conducted anonymously, without communication between the participants,
and repeated 9 rounds. Participants are only identified by a letter or a number called “code number”.
Neither the other participants nor the researcher will ever know how you decided. You are randomly
matched with another person after each round. You will never interact with the same person
again.
You are person 1.
Start of the study
Round 1:
The payo¤ table reads as follows:
First you have to choose between A and B.
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If you choose A, you and the other person receive 50 cents each.
If you choose B, the other person 2 gets to choose between Y and Z.
If person 2 chooses Y, you and person 2 receive 150 cents each.
If the other person chooses Z, chance decides about your earnings.
You earn 150 cents with probability 0.5 (#) and 20 cents with probability 0.5 ($), i.e. your
expected earnings after a chance move are 85 cents.
The other person earns 120 cents with probability 0.5 (# ) and 250 cents with probability 0.5
($), i.e. his or her expected earnings after a chance move are 185 cents.
Payo¤ Table
Who decides Alternatives Earnings for 1 Earnings for 2
Person 1
A
B
50
!
50
!
Person 2
Y
Z
150
!
150
!
Chance
# (prob = .5)
$ (prob = .5)
150
20
120
250
Now, please open your envelope. It contains 9 decision sheets and a code number sheet. Please
take everything out of the envelope. Keep the code number sheet. Then choose between A and
B. Indicate your choice on the decision sheet marked “Round 1”, put this decision sheet back into
the envelope and put it into the box which we will pass around. Keep all other decision sheets.
Persons 2 are randomly allocated an envelope and asked to look at your decision and–if they get
to make a choice–indicate their choice of either Y and Z on the decision sheet. Decision sheets will
be put back into the envelope and into the box.
40
We collect all decision sheets and count how many people in this room chose A, B, Y, and Z,
respectively, and inform all of you of the aggregate outcome of the first round. We then give you the
envelope back. Please take the decision out. The information on the decision sheet is private. Please
do not share it with anybody else.
Chance now decides whether # or $ will be realized in this round. For this purpose we draw a
card from a pile with 5 red and 5 black cards. Red implies #, black implies $.
We determine your earnings according to your choice and the choice of the other person after the
study is over. Your earnings will be paid to you in cash.
End of round 1.
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D Data
Table 8 summarizes behavior for all sessions over time.
Round
Session 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 (RLLB)
No Trust (T) 4 8 10 8 3 2 3 1 5
Trust & Breach (T,P ) 5 2 0 0 2 2 1 2 0
Trust & Perf. (T,P ) 1 0 0 2 5 6 6 7 5
2 (RMLB)
No Trust (T) 0 0 4 10 10 10 8 4 8
Trust & Breach (T,P ) 10 12 8 4 4 2 3 6 4
Trust & Perf. (T,P ) 4 2 2 0 0 2 3 4 2
3 (RHLB)
No Trust (T) 0 0 0 5 8 2 7 6 4
Trust & Breach (T,P ) 2 2 2 7 2 8 4 2 2
Trust & Perf. (T,P ) 12 12 12 2 4 4 3 6 8
4 (FMLB)
No Trust (T) 0 1 0 2 0 0 4 0 8
Trust & Breach (T,P ) 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
Trust & Perf. (T,P ) 7 7 8 6 8 6 4 8 0
5 (RLLH)
No Trust (T) 6 3 9 6 7 7 8 9 10
Trust & Breach (T,P ) 5 6 2 5 3 3 3 3 2
Trust & Perf. (T,P ) 6 8 6 6 7 7 6 5 5
6 (RMLH)
No Trust (T) 0 1 1 11 10 8 8 7 8
Trust & Breach (T,P ) 8 7 8 1 1 1 0 1 0
Trust & Perf. (T,P ) 6 6 5 2 3 5 6 6 6
Table 8: Behavior over time.
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